皆様、
『日本学術振興会・フランスANR CHORUSプログラム（平成23年度選定事業） 「真と偽を超えて：確信の度合い」』の高橋達二さんから、 以下のような講演会があることをお知らせしてほしいとの依頼で転送します。 ご興味のおありの方は、問い合わせ先に直接ご連絡ください。
塩谷賢
David Over 教授・Jean Baratgin 教授 講演会 「思考研究の新パラダイム」
日時： 2012年9月6日 15:00-17:30 場所： 立命館大学 朱雀キャンパス1F 多目的室 〒604-8520 京都市中京区西ノ京朱雀町1 （JR・地下鉄「二条」徒歩2分，阪急「大宮」徒歩10分） http://www.ritsumei.jp/accessmap/accessmap_suzaku_j.html プログラム： 0. イントロダクション
- Jean Baratgin教授（パリ第8大学）講演 「新パラダイム推論心理学と三値論理」
- David Over教授（英国ダーラム大学）講演 「作用域曖昧性・様相錯誤と新パラダイム推論心理学」
- ディスカッション
参加： 申込み不要・入場無料>
講演要旨：
New paradigm psychology of reasoning and three-valued logic
Jean Baratgin (Paragraphe [Universite Paris 8, Saint-Denis] & Institut Jean Nicod [ENS, Paris])
Two bodies of research in the psychology of reasoning support the new paradigm. The first result is that most people judge the probability of a conditional sentence to be equal to the conditional probability of the consequent on the antecedent (as implied by the Ramsey test). The second result is very old. It is the existence of a so-called defective truth table in which people judge irrelevant (`I') the two cases where the antecedent is false. Our presentation focuses on this second point. Uncertainty is a hallmark of the new paradigm. Thus if `I' is considered as a third value there is no defective table but rather a coherent table in which a third truth value that represents uncertainty is introduced. However a variety of three-valued systems of logic are available. We examine their descriptive adequacy for the usual connectives, including the conditional. Within this framework the so-called defective truth-table in which participants choose a third truth value when the antecedent of the conditional is false becomes an explainable and coherent response. Our main result is that the logic of de Finetti (and only this one) has a very good descriptive adequacy when uncertainty takes place as a third truth-value.
Scope ambiguities, modal fallacies, and new paradigm psychology of reasoning
David Over (Psychology Department, Durham University)
There is a new Bayesian / probabilistic paradigm in the psychology of reasoning. It depends on experiments in which participants respond that the probability of the natural language indicative conditional P(if p then q) is the conditional probability of q given p. Once this result, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), is fully established, a Bayesian account of conditional reasoning, and so of reasoning in general, is sure to follow. However, the result depends on the participants applying the probability operator to the whole conditional, in a wide scope interpretation, and not to its consequent, in a narrow scope interpretation. The problem is that modal operators like probability can cause scope ambiguities in natural language and modal fallacies. Scope ambiguities and the associated modal fallacies are a well researched topic in logic and philosophy. Yet the psychology of reasoning has paid little attention to this topic, in spite of its intrinsic interest and relevance to the new paradigm. We will illustrate how modal fallacies have been committed by supporters of old paradigm psychology of reasoning in their response to the evidence for P(if p then q) = P(q|p). An experimental programme will be described supporting the conclusion that the probability operator is generally given wide, and not narrow, scope in conditionals.
主催： 立命館大学人間科学研究所 文部科学省 私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業（平成22年度選定事業） 「大学を模擬社会空間とした自立支援のための持続的対人援助モデルの構築」 共催： 日本学術振興会・フランスANR CHORUSプログラム（平成23年度選定事業） 「真と偽を超えて：確信の度合い」 共催： 関西思考研究会
問い合わせ先： 山 祐嗣（大阪市大） [email protected] 服部雅史（立命館大） [email protected]